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The Malaysian Plot 
Marcos, Sabah, and the Origins 
of Moro Secessionism
The Lahad Datu incident makes a re-examination of Philippine 
claim to Sabah compelling. During the twenty-year Marcosian 
rule, the Sabah claim somewhat defined Philippine foreign 
policy in its relation to Malaysia and to ASEAN. It was made 
complicated by the formation of a Moro rebellion. What is the 
role of Malaysia in the secessionist movement in the south? 
This article examines this in light of “old” and “new” sources, 
as it tries to explore a possible conspiracy between Malaysian 
leaders, the Liberal Party, and some Moro leaders behind the 
rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu, and its connection to Sabah. 
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!e recent crisis in Lahad Datu, in which a self-proclaimed Royal 
Army of the Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah is getting the brunt of brutal 
military crackdown from Malaysian armed forces, seems to be the 
long culmination of a bungled attempt in 1968, when a special force 
was trained only to end in a so-called Jabidah “massacre.” It has been 
forty-"ve years since the gruesome tale was exposed to the public by 
the president’s father, the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. !e son, 
President Benigno Aquino III, on 18 March, led a commemoration 
activity in Corregidor Island. But did the bloodbath really take place? 
Or was it part of a dirty Malaysian scheme to destabilize Mindanao 
and Sulu so that the Philippine government would postpone, if not 
to completely withdraw, its claim on Sabah? Was the opposition, the 
Liberal Party, part of the conspiracy? How did President Ferdinand 
Marcos deal with the claim before and after the alleged incident? 
In the present impasse, there are speculations that the stando# is a 
Malaysian ploy both by the opposition and the present administration 
that are vying for electoral victory. Are we being taken for a ride by 
the Malaysians, at the expense of the patrimony of the Sulu Sultanate 
and the people of Mindanao, victims of foreign intervention that 
greatly impoverished the region? Can we say that the Moros and their 
representatives, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was 
double crossed by the Malaysians to give up their claim to Sabah in 
exchange of arms and other support? !e information from a number 
of declassi"ed dispatches from the US embassy in Manila, as released 
by the US National Archives and corrected by Wikileaks, con"rms a 
number of things on the shady role of Malaysia in fomenting rebellion 
and supporting the overthrow of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and 
the diplomatic engagements between Malaysia and the Philippines 
regarding the claim.
A number of studies had dealt with Sabah, but the discussion 
centered on its legality and its e#ect on the conduct of Philippine 
foreign policy. Noble (1977) examined the Philippine claim to Sabah 
and concluded that the main reason it was pursued was that Filipinos 
wanted to assert independence to shake o# an image of dependency. 
Using a comparative perspective, W. K. Che Man (1990) tackled the 
Moro rebellion in the south, placing it alongside a similar Muslim 
struggle in !ailand—both were supported by the Malaysians—
to generate concepts and ideas on religious and ethnic separatist 
movements. Azurin (1996) collected his published essays on Muslim 
struggle in Mindanao, one of which highlighted the improbability 
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of “massacre” in the so-called Jabidah hullabaloo. Vitug and Gloria 
(2000) resurrected the myth of the “massacre,” making it appear as 
though it was the cause of the con!ict when it was only the tipping 
point for a long history of Moro struggle. "ere were hints and explicit 
mentions on the Malaysian role in the escalation of the Muslim 
dissidence in these works, but no one deeply inquired on the long-
standing participation of Malaysia in the training of Muslim rebels 
in the south, from its beginnings to the MNLF and MILF (Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front) that we know now. "is article examines this 
angle by looking at how Marcos took action on the claim to Sabah as it 
a#ected Philippine-Malaysia relations and the resolution of the armed 
struggle in Mindanao. It re-examines the Jabidah “massacre” and raises 
the possibility of Malaysian interference even before the creation of a 
secessionist movement. It suggests ways on how to resolve the claim 
and the problem in Mindanao and Sulu.
In brief, Sabah was a territory of the Sulu Sultanate that was leased 
at $rst to two adventurers who later transferred their rights to a British 
company. It was a grant of land in 1675 from the Brunei Sultan to the 
Sulu Sultan for the help in quelling a rebellion (Majul 1999). From 
1878 to 1903, when the con$rmatory deed was signed, the area was 
ruled over by the company until it assumed protectorate status under 
the British. In 1915, the Carpenter Agreement was signed between the 
US government and the Sulu Sultan, whereby the latter relinquished 
his rights to temporal sovereignty, tax collection, and arbitration 
laws in exchange of an allowance, a lot of land, and recognition as 
religious leader, without a#ecting his sovereign rights over Sabah. 
In 1936, when Sultan Jamalul Kiram II died, the Commonwealth 
under President Manuel Quezon abolished the Sulu Sultanate, but 
he recognized the Sultan as religious head; datus and sultan were 
recognized without o%cial rights and powers. Calling it a deed of 
cession, the Macaskie decision of 1939 by the High Court of North 
Borneo rendered a judgment that while the successor-in-sovereignty 
to the Sulu Sultanate was the Philippine government, the sultan’s heirs 
could claim precedence as to its sovereignty and were entitled to the 
so-called “cession monies” from the company. After World War II 
under the Japanese, Sabah was ruled by the British military before 
Britain illegally made it a crown colony.
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MARCOS AND THE RECOGNITION OF MALAYSIA
In 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal initiated to claim Sabah 
when the British relinquished their rights therein for the creation of 
the Federation of Malaysia (Leifer 1968). Amidst the protests from 
Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia was born on 16 September 
1963. !e reservations on the result of the UN Ascertainment of 
September 1963 about the wishes of the people of Sabah to join 
the federation led Macapagal to not recognize Malaysia and sever 
diplomatic ties. Malaysia followed suit. In August 1964, consular 
relations between the two countries were reestablished as agreed upon 
by Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Macapagal 
in Phnom Penh in February 1965, in a series of diplomatic tête-à-tête. 
According to Macapagal (1968; 1989), Rahman agreed on elevating 
the dispute to the World Court. Macapagal maintained to not 
recognize Malaysia, since recognition was seen as tantamount to giving 
waiver to Malaysia regarding the claim to Sabah. But as the election 
campaign drew close, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Macapagal’s contender to 
the presidency, dangled the imminent recognition of Malaysia should 
he win. Marcos won the elections, and a new interesting policy that 
would direct Philippine ship of state away from stormy seas, albeit 
temporarily, was to take place during his presidency before the Jabidah 
mess.
!e complete reversal of Philippine policy over Malaysia vis-à-vis 
Sabah was not simply a matter of political convenience to Marcos. 
It had to do with the growing smuggling menace in the Southern 
backdoor, which with Malaysia’s help could at least be minimized. !e 
turnaround would entail an arrangement between the two countries. 
!e Philippines would recognize Malaysia in 1966 without prejudice 
to the claim to Sabah and with, at the same time, an economic and 
political concession in terms of an anti-smuggling agreement with the 
latter in 1967. While this compromise had restored at least the regional 
harmony in Southeast Asia, for fears of harming the interest of the 
newly-established Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in August 1967—members were trying their best to mediate notably 
post-Sukarno Indonesia—Marcos’s policy with regard to Sabah 
would change eventually. Such changes will be noted here to unravel 
the reasons behind the often precarious relationship with Malaysia, 
marked by insecurity. Of course, the underlying factor would be the 
Philippine claim to Sabah, which alarms Malaysia should Sabah secede 
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and eventually establish an independent state of its own. It turned out 
that what Malaysia feared to happen did happen in the Philippines, 
through Malaysia’s willful participation in the training and arming of 
Moro rebels in Sabah, as I shall recount later.
It did not take long when rapprochement began. Malaysia supported 
Manila’s bid to become the headquarters of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) (Leifer 1968). President Marcos also hinted at this when 
he stressed in his inaugural address the need to strengthen ties with 
Asian countries. !en both countries sent notes expressing their desire 
to raise outposts to embassy level, but it was only in June 1966 that it 
took e"ect, with the appointment of ambassadors. Malaysia in a note 
said that they still recognized their obligations in the Manila Accord 
of 31 July 1963, including the Joint Statement, and pointed out that 
particularly paragraph 12 of the Accord and paragraph 8 of the Joint 
Statement—the recognition did not prejudice the Philippine claim to 
Sabah and that there should be e"orts in settling the claim through 
peaceful means by negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial 
determination—as binding to them. What delayed the recognition 
was the threat from Sukarno severing ties with Manila should the 
recognition pushed through (Noble 1977). Marcos was forced to 
postpone the rites, but when Sukarno was deposed in March, the 
recognition became imminent as the change of regime welcomed such 
development.
While Marcos intended to recognize Malaysia since the onset of 
his presidency, he has never moved away from the o#cial position that 
the claim must still be pursued. He was bent on tackling the issue of 
smuggling with Malaysia. It was better to relegate the claim in order to 
achieve smooth relations with Malaysia after three years of stagnancy. 
In July 1966, Mr. Peter Lo, the Chief Minister of Sabah, came to 
Manila to inaugurate Malaysian Airways’ $rst %ight to the capital 
without creating any fuss. !en Malaysia invited the Philippines 
to send observers to the $rst direct elections in Sabah to be held in 
April 1967. It was recommended that two representatives be sent 
to observe the elections, but with a proviso that such action would 
not a"ect the claim. Marcos decided to reject it on the belief that it 
might prejudice the claim. Another factor was the allegation of Liberal 
Party Senator Jovito Salonga, that such action would lead the claim to 
estoppel in international law. Marcos might have also noted the fact 
that the planned anti-smuggling agreement was not gaining grounds 
(Leifer 1968). !e election did not escape controversy when a tactless 
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Philippine consul-general in Singapore aired an uno!cial view in a 
letter to a major daily, that internal security laws prevent the holding 
of “free” elections (Noble 1977). Malaysia was upset and the diplomat 
was recalled. Marcos’s doubts about the election was con"rmed when 
it took a form of referendum; all candidates favored being federated to 
Malaysia, and thirty-one out of thirty-two elected assemblymen had 
platforms rejecting the claim (Quintos 1969). One can see here the 
beginning of duplicitous conduct by Malaysia, besides the claim that 
Rahman agreed on settling the dispute in the World Court.
Amidst the silent tension that the mischief has created, there were 
reports that the government planned a meeting of Philippine and 
Malaysian representatives in Manila to talk about the settlement of 
the claim and "nally towards a discussion on the mode of settlement. 
#e meeting did not push through. Did Marcos begin to sense that 
Malaysia was not really willing to settle the dispute? #e Manila Accord 
was signed in July 1963. Four years had lapsed since it was signed, but 
no headway in the resolution of the claim was visible. And in July, the 
public admission of Foreign A$airs Secretary Narciso Ramos—that the 
claim was not in agreement with Article I, section 1 of the Philippine 
constitution—contributed to the softening of the strain between the 
two countries. Ramos’s admission was to be regarded as indiscretion 
on his part in exposing the vulnerable side of the claim. #e issue on 
the elections did not deter the two countries, together with Indonesia, 
#ailand, and Singapore, from establishing the ASEAN in August. 
Furthermore, Ramos, who went to Kuala Lumpur in September on 
behalf of the Philippine government, was successful with the signing 
of anti-smuggling agreement. #e agreement contained the expressed 
permission of Malaysia to the establishment of Philippine liaison 
customs o!ce in Sempurna, Sandakan, and Tawau in Sabah. #e 
agreement also stipulated on the need for regulating and controlling 
the trade in Southern Philippines, namely, in Sulu and Zamboanga, 
and Sabah. Since the country has an outstanding claim on Sabah, a 
clause was provided in the agreement to guarantee that in spite of the 
above provisions, it will not a$ect the territorial claim. 
Despite the minor di$erences relating to the claim, the Philippines 
tried its best not to engage in any political mishaps that happened in 
the past which could hurt Malaysian sensitivity. Instead of pursuing a 
hard-line position towards the claim, political discretion and diplomatic 
tact mattered in exchange for better relations with Malaysia, although 
this could be doubted later. #e selection committee of the Ramon 
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Magsaysay Awards gave the government service award to Malaysia 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak for the year 1967, which 
could not evade a political tinge. In November, Razak visited Manila, 
which was reciprocated by Marcos and the First Lady in a state visit 
to Malaysia in January the following year. !ese conciliatory moves 
at face value would point to the desire of the Philippine government 
to stay clear of diplomatic controversies, but nonetheless the motives 
of Marcos would be questioned later in the course of intriguing 
revelations.
OPLAN MERDEKA AND THE 
ALLEGED JABIDAH “MASSACRE”: 
DISSECTING A PSY-WAR OPERATION 
Sometime in September 1967, one Major Abdullatif Martelino, also 
known as Eddie before he became a Muslim convert, came to Sulu 
to recruit Tausug men, ages eighteen to thirty (Aquino 1985). He 
scoured the Sulu archipelago, taking him four months to undertake 
the massive recruitment intended allegedly to create a special force of 
paratroopers after a six-month training and integration to the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines. He persuaded their elders to let their men 
join the mission by promising distribution of lands once the secret 
mission was over. A camp equipped with a radio room was erected in 
Simunul Island for the purpose of training the said recruits with their 
uniforms, badges, brand new carbines, and !ompson submachine 
guns. Although the mission was believed to be a secret, Martelino’s 
dealings betrayed the plan deliberately and everyone in Sulu knew 
what was happening inside the camp. Recruitment ended in mid-
December, and by the end of the month, the 135 enlisted men aboard 
the Philippine Navy vessel were transported to their new training 
camp in Corregidor Island. Prior to their arrival, Defense o"cials 
visited the campsite and ordered that the old hospital be cordoned o# 
as a restricted area. !e old hospital would be the lodging place of the 
recruits. For the subsequent weeks, they undertook rigorous training 
in Corregidor jungles. A delay in the release of their allowances caused 
some of them to petition for redress until they were told to resign if 
they could not wait. Others were sent home, while the remaining ones 
engaged in speculations that their co-recruits were killed until it got 
into their heads that there was a massacre. 
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In the wake of these events, Marcos must have initiated, together 
with some top-ranking defense o!cials, the setting up of secret 
paramilitary troops under his command. Was it, as alleged, for the 
ostensible purpose of freeing a territory? Aquino (1985) related an 
incident four weeks before his Senate speech—either late February 
or early March—that a former head of the country’s intelligence 
service told him of a plot contrived by Marcos. Why would a former 
head tell this highly secret plan to Aquino? Was this former head the 
chief during the Macapagal administration? Macapagal was a Liberal 
and so he would only place a Liberal Party member as head of the 
country’s intelligence agency (Macapagal 1968). He was Gen. Marcos 
Soliman, a classmate and a fellow Kapampangan. "e connection 
becomes clear when one considers Aquino’s ethnic a!liation. Why 
would a former head tell of a government secret that would place the 
country in jeopardy, except that there was a political motive behind it? 
When did Marcos take that initiative is a matter of speculation, but 
the sequence of events give a hint. It took months of planning, but to 
assume that the planning was under way since probably months after 
his inauguration is too much. He proceeded to recognize Malaysia and 
purportedly subordinated the claim in the spirit of regional harmony 
to the agreement on anti-smuggling. According to US intelligence, 
Malaysian intelligence service had known since May 1967 that the 
Philippines was involved in a plot to subvert Sabah (Hughes [1968] 
2000). If this claim is true, then Marcos initiated it even before the 
organization of ASEAN. "at the intelligence gathering by the 
Malaysians was far ahead of the implementation would lead us to 
conclude that a Malaysian mole had in#ltrated the highest echelons of 
Philippine government. 
In the third week of March 1968, a devastating exposé shattered 
the secrecy that had shrouded the plan. It was true that in Sulu the 
secret mission was widely known, such that the possibility of media 
exposure was far from nil. Aquino (1985), in his speech, talked about 
the misgivings of Muslim leaders who told him about what was 
happening in Sulu, referring to the recruitments and trainings, but this 
was in the second week of February. Arula came out as the sole survivor 
of the alleged massacre of Muslim trainees, thereby disclosing to the 
public the Oplan Jabidah, the code for the project. Arula’s testimony 
recounted the events that led to the supposed massacre. Belonging to 
the last batch of twelve recruits who were brought to the Corregidor 
airstrip for the purpose of evacuation, they were ordered to dismount 
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their weapons carrier and told to form a line upon reaching the airstrip. 
!ey were shot by their military escorts who were armed with high-
caliber weapons. With a gunshot wound on his left thigh, Arula ran as 
fast as he could, until he seemed to see a mountain towards a cli" that 
brought him to the open sea, clinging to a piece of driftwood when 
rescued by two #sherman, probably from Cavite (Vitug and Gloria 
2000). He sought Governor Del#n Montano of Cavite. !ere, he 
divulged the supposed massacre. !e governor, a Liberal Party member, 
called up Liberal Party Congressman Rashid Lucman of Lanao del 
Sur. Lucman went to Cavite to have a conversation with the survivor.
Opposition leaders capitalized on the controversy to discredit 
the Marcos administration (Azurin 1996). After his visit to Cavite, 
Lucman informed Mindanao leaders about the incident, along with 
Senators Aquino and Gerardo Roxas. Lucman, with Congressman 
Salih Ututalum, again went to Cavite to cross-examine Arula. After 
the veri#cation and corroboration of Arula’s testimony, which they 
found it to be credible, the Liberal Party announced the holding of 
press conference, in which Aquino revealed the alleged massacre, 
presenting Arula to the public. Marcos was caught red-handed 
by the opposition. In the heat of the controversy, Lucman #led an 
Impeachment bill against Marcos. During the congressional hearing 
on the case, Marcos presented the recruits and said that there was 
no massacre for they were alive, accusing Arula of being a liar and a 
paid agent working for the Malaysians. Aquino might have been too 
hurried to acknowledge the alleged massacre in the press conference, 
which the Muslim leaders had been taking advantage of in a political 
showdown with Marcos. Lucman, in a privilege speech, accused the 
president of conspiring a plot “not only to recover North Borneo 
[Sabah] by means of in#ltration, sabotage and terrorism, but also to 
create chaos and disorder among the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu” 
(as quoted in Azurin 1996, 85). !is assumption was not proven since 
Aquino (1985), in his speech before the Senate, explained why he 
checked out his scheduled privilege speech a day before. He wanted 
to verify Arula’s testimony as doubt nagged him; to check out the 
international repercussions and to con#rm the story where it started, 
that was in Sulu.
Aquino’s investigation brought some devastating revelations against 
Arula’s testimony, although at times his sworn statement corroborated 
with the facts of the investigation. “Were they really ‘massacred’?” 
Aquino threw this question before the Senate. A barrage of careful 
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deductions followed, in which he underscored why he believed that 
there was no massacre. He said that this was not a massacre, for there 
was no “wanton killing of men—maybe premeditated, but de!nitely 
committed according to a previous plan.” (1985, 55). He categorically 
asserted that there was no plan at all to kill the recruits. He further 
inquired that if the perpetrators wanted to silence them by bloodbath 
of sorts, how come they released the twenty-four men, which were 
believed to have been massacred all along, but were found and met 
alive and kicking? Arula’s testimony was half-lie and half-truth, and 
the supposed massacre could be the product of a mind exhausted by 
the paramilitary training and regimen. Instead of a massacre which the 
probability he said was dim, he submitted that there could have been 
killings, but these belonged to the criminal category of murder.
"ere were multiple versions of the reasons why there were killings 
and why there was the need to set up a secret training camp. "e 
government o#ered the o$cial version, that the secret training was 
a counter-insurgency operation to deal with Indonesian communist 
in!ltrators in Mindanao after the overthrow of Sukarno. Some 
mutinied due to non-release of their monthly allowances and rigorous 
training, which led to the death of one o$cer and “a few” recruits 
(Noble 1977, 165). Another version was that of Arula, which recounted 
that a massacre ensued after a faction of the recruits threatened mutiny 
over non-payment of their allowances, and he luckily survived and 
escaped to tell his story about the secret training camp and the plans of 
sabotage and in!ltration in Sabah. Another version, which was di#erent 
from the two, came from the most controversial !gure, Martelino, who 
testi!ed before the Congressional investigators. Contrary to Arula’s 
version, Project Merdeka was conceived due to intelligence reports 
that some Muslim warlords were organizing their private armies 
with the aim of in!ltrating and occupying Sabah (Azurin 1996). Its 
purpose was to avert these groups into doing just that by luring them 
into joining the secret training, as it aimed to neutralize the private 
armies’ intent of getting into trouble with Malaysia. He also said that 
by luring them into their secret paramilitary unit, with superior arms 
and training as a comeon, they had been successful in in!ltrating and 
locating these private armies. "ey were so successful that the training 
camp in Simunul could not accommodate the in%ux of recruits. 
Corregidor Island became the next stage point, as they were instructed 
to turn over these recruits to the Philippine Army to give them special 
training. "e !rst phase of the Project ended on 31 December, and the 
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second phase started on 3 January, with a mission di!erent from the 
"rst phase.
Aquino did an investigation to verify which one was plausible. 
According to him, there was indeed a plan to in"ltrate Sabah with a 
“secret strike force” and under the guise of covert crackdown of private 
armies. Before it could take on its mission, it was apparently sabotaged 
in the hands of double agents. In Aquino’s view, which coincided with 
Marcos, Arula was a double agent but not necessarily connected to 
Malaysia, though we cannot overlook this fact (Quijano de Manila 
1968). His "ndings, which found a place in the Philippines Free Press, 
discounted the tale of a mutiny and massacre, but suggested a more 
convincing story: that of a divided camp. #ere was enough evidence 
to suggest that a struggle ensued between loyalists’ faction and faction 
of mutineers, which implied that the supposed in"ltration force was 
in"ltrated by double agents. Was there a hidden Malaysian hand in 
the disclosure? Reading the mind of Aquino, Azurin (1996) suggested 
that to Aquino, Arula’s story was a staged drama that highlighted a 
massacre. #e detailed unfolding of events in Arula’s accounting was 
highly suspect. Aquino (1985), in his speech, acknowledged that “the 
counterinsurgency forces of a neighboring country” in"ltrated the 
recruitment in Sulu. #e Philippine government, in fact, in a secret 
reply to a Malaysian note, accused the Malaysians of in"ltrating the 
Philippines from Sabah (Hughes [1968] 2000, 808). From another 
angle: A Cavite smuggling lord, Montano had a settle to score with 
Marcos. He was a Liberal that had fallen out of the good graces 
of Malacañang, which favored a former crony of Montano, Lino 
Bocalan, also a smuggling lord. Bocalan was said to have "nanced the 
recruitment and training in Sulu and Corregidor (Vitug and Gloria 
2000). It was not only a rivalry between warlords or smuggling lords 
that brought the incident to the public (Tiglao 2013a), but it was 
a clever gambit by the Liberal Party to challenge Marcos, who was 
gunning for a re-election.
Why did Marcos abort the plan? Did he receive intelligence 
reports that a leak had been made to the opposition? Soliman, the 
former NICA chief under Macapagal, was the one who tipped Aquino 
on the plan. A few weeks later, an international journalist, who was not 
named, interviewed Aquino. He chitchatted about the plan with him, 
who also told of an “alarming coincidence that built in his analytical 
mind, a web of high-octane adventure” (Aquino 1985, 45). #e identity 
of this journalist, possibly white, is again suspicious. Was he privy to 
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what was happening in Corregidor? !en Aquino alleged to have 
pieced together events and was at the point of revealing to the public, 
when Arula came out of the sanguinary a"air. Aquino had known the 
misgivings of Muslim leaders in the second week of February. Since 
Martelino was very open on the invasion of some land, the Muslim 
leaders must have known what this recruitment was intended for. US 
intelligence alleged that some members of the opposition might have 
known the secret plan at the outset (Hughes 1968).1 By December, the 
Malaysian operatives had known of guerrillas being trained in Sulu 
(Hughes [1968] 2000). It would only take somebody from the Malaysian 
side to contact the Liberal Party in Mindanao and concoct a plan to 
stage the whole drama of “massacre.” !is assumption coincides with 
Azurin (1996, 102–3), who wrote that the secret plan “was apparently 
sabotaged by double agents who then used it as a launching pad for 
Bangsamoro secessionism.” If Arula was a Malaysian double agent, 
he or another double agent could have incited his fellow Muslims 
to mutiny over non-payment of allowance or over the mission order 
of inciting rebellion in Sabah. If there was an attempt to kill all the 
recruits to “conceal the true nature of the mission” as Salonga (2001, 
132) put it, why would Aquino #nd twenty-four trainees in Sulu? 
!e slaughter of the last batches by their superiors must have been 
caused by the discovery that they were spies, so that the perpetrators 
were acquitted in the military trial in 1971. Martelino’s role was even 
more mysterious. An undercover agent of Macapagal, he supplied the 
Liberals with black propaganda materials against Marcos who was 
running against Macapagal (Aquino 1985). Marcos took him in as 
head of the Defense Department’s Civil A"airs O$ce and became 
the chief architect of the Oplan Merdeka. He bungled the a"air by 
letting Arula escape. Was he in collusion with the Malaysians or the 
Liberal Party? Exonerated from the military trial, he intriguingly went 
back to Sabah in 1973 and was believed to be dead or languishing in a 
Malaysian jail (Vitug and Gloria 2000).
!e international repercussion of the whole a"air, which was 
publicized widely in local newspapers, included the venting of 
Malaysian resentment and condemnation over the issue (Noble 1977, 
1983). !ough red-faced, Marcos, who had visited Malaysia in January, 
denied these allegations and further declared that war was never a state 
policy, Rahman warned that trouble between the two countries would 
come. His threat was apparent as he beckoned his Commonwealth 
allies, Australia and New Zealand, to deploy their battleships near 
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Philippine-Malaysian borders. He accused Marcos of having betrayed 
his pronouncements. Twenty Filipinos were arrested in Sabah, and 
Malaysia had linked them up with the incident, saying the weapons 
con!scated from them were exactly the same used in Corregidor. Were 
these Filipinos really associated with the failed operation? Were the 
Malaysians trying to blow the issue out of proportion? "e question 
that arises was how they were able to ascertain that the weapons used 
in Corregidor were the same as the ones con!scated several days after 
the alleged massacre. Investigations were ongoing and the public was 
agog of the news. It only goes to show that Malaysian agents knew 
more than Filipinos about the incident, or that a spy in pay of the 
Malaysians was spinning the situation. In fact, the !rst person who 
visited the camp was a Caucasian who went ahead of government 
o#cials (Azurin 1996). Aquino in his speech did not acknowledge 
these twenty Filipinos as belonging to the trainees. Six months after 
the incident, Marcos (1968) revealed in a radio-television chat that 
there were Malaysian agents roaming in Mindanao and Sulu. Rahman 
clamored for an international inquiry. "e Malaysian government even 
expressed their concern to the United Nations. Amidst this Malaysian 
kibitzing, the public, especially the press, stressed that this was an 
internal a$air.
"e Philippines responded with an invitation to the negotiating 
table (Azurin 1996). Salvador P. Lopez, the Philippine Ambassador to 
the United Nations, challenged Malaysia to let the issue be decided by 
the World Court, arguing that as long as the Sabah dispute remained 
unresolved, mutual suspicion and fear would disturb Philippine-
Malaysian relations. Malaysia did not accept the challenge. Rahman 
just contented himself with the conduct of the investigation, expressing 
high hopes that the issue would !nd its way to a just solution. In 
an exchange of notes between April and May 1968, both agreed 
to hold talks in Bangkok to clarify the Philippine claim, towards 
discussing the modes of settlement. "e controversy served as a wick 
in the detonation of a political bomb hurled against Marcos by his 
political adversaries, notably Lucman (ibid.). Lucman charged that the 
president had personal motive in pursuing Sabah, because the latter 
had secured the power of attorney, giving the right to get Sabah back 
through negotiations or other means. "e heirs, he said, would give a 
substantial percentage in the partition of a future settlement for anyone 
who could return Sabah to them. Not only did he accuse Marcos of 
having a personal interest in the claim, he also insinuated that Marcos 
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was guilty of creating dissensions among Muslims, and asked him if 
it was his policy, through the AFP, of liquidating his fellow Muslims. 
!is allegation of genocide would appear in the propaganda campaign 
of the secessionist groups, making it the primary reason why they were 
taking rebellion against the government, and which found sympathy 
in the form of direct Malaysian involvement that would subsequently 
take place.
As the conference in Bangkok was approaching, the press in Sabah 
was unrelenting in its criticism of the Philippines (Noble 1977). Tun 
Mustapha, Sabah’s Chief Minister, alleged that Kuala Lumpur had 
been betrayed by Marcos on his promise to not pursue the claim, in 
exchange for Malaysian help in curbing smuggling. !e Sabah "nance 
minister ridiculed the Philippine clamor of bringing the dispute in the 
World Court, saying that what they could not get through plebiscite, 
because it would falter, they want to get it through the World Court, 
and further called on the Sabahans to be vigilant in the midst of possible 
Filipino in"ltrators. Political associations and parties announced their 
rejection of the claim, and declared that they would be behind any 
government moves. While Rahman accused Marcos of acting in bad 
faith, Malaysia, in turn, embarked on directly interfering with the 
a#airs of another nation by fanning the anger of the Filipino Muslims 
and providing them logistical support for their secessionist dreams. 
Aquino’s speculation that Arula was a double agent, which Marcos 
also assumed as he accused him of being a paid Malaysian agent, 
might point to this. Who "rst did espionage and in"ltration between 
their ranks is not clear, but it might point to the Malaysians, who 
had contested territory to protect. As the greatest coup in Philippine 
history as others see it (Tiglao 2013b), the Corregidor “massacre” 
became the potent vehicle for psy-war by Filipino Muslims in the 
south to stage their rebellion against the government. 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE BANGKOK TALKS: 
MALAYSIAN INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT 
OF MORO INSURGENCY
Prior to the scheduled meeting in Bangkok, Rahman secretly invited 
Lucman to Kuala Lumpur in May 1968 (Lucman 2010). Rahman, 
along with Mustapha and Malaysian foreign minister, Ghazali Sha"e, 
told Lucman that they were willing to train Filipino Muslims, about 
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10,000 men, who will be supplied with ammunitions, a base, and 
other logistical support. !e trainees would "ght for Mindanao’s 
independence to divert the attention of the Philippine government 
from the Sabah claim. Lucman in June began recruiting ninety-
two Muslims from Moro provinces, and sent them to Sabah for the 
training to be given by the Malaysian Special Forces. Established on 1 
May 1968 by Datu Udtog Matalam, the Muslim—later, Mindanao—
Independence Movement (MIM) recruited youths for the training. 
!e Bangkok conference in June and July that would end in failure, 
as recounted subsequently, was not to be wondered at, given the 
Malaysian brainchild of instigating an uprising in Mindanao. Sha"e’s 
arrogant behavior in the diplomatic table was not surprising too, since 
the Malaysian side had decided beforehand that there would be no 
settlement at all, as they wanted the Philippine claim to Sabah to be 
waylaid by other important—that is, security—concerns.
!e "rst four weeks that started on 17 June was a long quibble 
on procedural matter, aggravated by technical problems suspected 
of foul play, delays in the arrival of documents from Manila, and 
the incompetence of the Philippine delegation (Noble 1977). !e 
Malaysians kept on seeking clari"cation, which Filipinos found too 
long and thought would be best to do so in the International Court 
of Justice. International law expert Florentino Feliciano arrived in the 
scene, followed by Ambassador to India, Leon Ma. Guerrero. Guerrero, 
the outspoken nationalist, in a press statement said bluntly: “One of 
the reasons I’ve come here is to get to the real point, which is whether 
the Malaysians are ready to face world opinion in the International 
Court or whether they intend to persist in this unworthy policy of 
merely squatting in North Borneo as the forced heirs and puppets of British 
imperialists and neocolonialists. It appears that behind the Malaysian 
delegation here there are not only British ‘backroom boys,’ but the 
British Navy and the British Air Force, and perhaps the territorials 
[my italics]” (as quoted in Noble 1977, 172). 
!e following day, the Philippine delegation decided to put a 
stop to the clari"cation and move to discussing modes of settlement. 
!e Malaysian delegation allegedly asked for three more sessions 
for clari"cations. Sha"e, who was present in the secret meeting with 
Lucman, disappointed, rose up and spoke on behalf of his delegation 
in a long disquisition that the meat and substance of was that the 
Philippine claim had no legal and political basis and that he was 
rejecting the claim. !e Philippine delegation, the next day, responded 
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in two parts. Incensed, Guerrero minced no words that nothing would 
change their present stand, no matter the length of time devoted to 
clari!cation, and questioned the superciliousness of Sha!e in rejecting 
the claim. He declared that the Malaysians “were insincere in these 
conversations,” and said that “to pretend to settle dispute himself and 
reject the Philippine claim is preposterous, utterly absurd” (as cited in 
Tolentino 1990, 490). Feliciano talked on the legality of the Philippine 
claim. To add insult to injury, the Malaysian side even asked the 
Filipinos if there was anything to discuss before they walked out, 
according to the deputy prime minister, but what was there to discuss 
when they had rejected the claim unilaterally. "us, the talks ended 
in !asco after a mouthful of accusations and counter-accusations; 
Malaysians called Filipinos “cheats,” even denigrating the Sulu Sultan 
as “pirate,” to which the Filipinos sought apology ( Javier 1968a). While 
the Philippines might have been sincere in settling the dispute, it was 
Malaysia, along with their British proxies, that the meeting failed as 
they were intent on not discussing ways of settlement. In fact, one 
can say that they deceived the Philippine government from the very 
beginning; they signed the Manila Accord and the joint communiqué 
to get Manila’s recognition of Malaysia.
"e disaster in Bangkok strengthened the resolve of the Philippines 
to bolster its claim. Back in Manila, the debacle was met with 
recriminations on the incompetence of the Philippine representatives, 
saved only by the timely rescue of Guerrero. At !rst, the Department 
of Foreign A#airs wanted to withdraw its head of mission in Kuala 
Lumpur, leaving the embassy in care of an assistant until “a cooling 
o# ” period was agreed upon that delayed their complete departure. 
In view of the loophole in the Tolentino resolution of 1961, which 
did not include Sabah and raised by the Malaysians in Bangkok, 
Philippine Congress enacted a law de!ning the baselines of the 
Philippine archipelago to include the territorial sea around Sabah 
( Javier 1968b; Senoren 1968; Patanñe 1968). When it was signed into 
law in September, Malaysia abrogated the anti-smuggling pact and 
recalled its ambassador. "e so-called “annexation law” fueled angry 
demonstrations and protests in Malaysia; in Kota Kinabalu, a Marcos 
e$gy was burned (Weekly Nation 1968; Javier 1968c). Demonstrators 
in Manila centered on the US, British, and Malaysian embassies. A 
US state department spokesman said that they recognized Malaysia 
including Sabah. "e British were reported to have diverted six RAF 
Hunter aircraft %ying over Sabah, instead of the usual direct %ight 
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from Hong Kong to Singapore, and that a British commander said 
that his !eet would be behind Malaysia (Senoren 1968). To rub salt 
in the wound, the US Air Force allowed British jets bound to Sabah 
to refuel at Clark Field (Marcos 1977). Marcos was said to have been 
hurt by US actuations. "e Philippines by the end of November would 
cut its ties with Malaysia, withdrawing its embassy.
"e election in both countries was the predominant issue the 
following year (Noble 1977). "e Liberal Party, through Lucman, made 
the Corregidor “massacre” alive in the election campaign; he secured 
an a#davit from one survivor, most probably Arula, detailing the 
“massacre,” but the administration denied the claims. "e Nacionalista 
courted one Muslim to run for the Senate. "e administration party 
condemned the Liberal Party’s statements as provoking Muslim 
separatist aspirations. One Nacionalista spokesman reported of 
massive propaganda on radio from a neighboring country, which was 
no less than Malaysia, exhorting the people to rebel and aspire for 
independence, brainwashing them on the abuses committed by the 
Christian government and extolling the virtues of separate existence 
or even “annexation,” perhaps as part of Malaysia by unlimited 
opportunities for Muslims as bureaucrats and o#cials. Rumors that 
Marcos was targeted for assassination by the Huks were circulating in 
early November, while the Philippine Constabulary was on heightened 
alert on 100 Muslims who were trained again in a neighboring country, 
no doubt Malaysia, and that a Liberal Party politician paid for the 
Jolo-Cebu tickets of these assassins. "e Liberal Party had a bigger 
role than Lucman’s in the creation of a Moro rebellion. Marcos won 
in Sulu and the whole country, defeating Sergio Osmeña, Jr. He must 
have known the support by Malaysians given to Muslim groups but 
decided to keep silent, which was the greatest blunder he committed 
against the national interest. But was he waiting for the rebellion to 
happen for his own vested interest? He agreed on restoring relations 
with Malaysia; Carlos P. Romulo, the new foreign a$airs secretary, did 
the negotiation, so that by 16 December, Rahman announced at the 
ASEAN meeting the resumption of ties. "ere was no dropping of the 
claim, but Malaysian newspapers took it that there was.
Malaysians in collusion with Lucman succeeded in 1970 of 
training not 10,000 warriors but 28,000 insurgents, ready to do battle 
against the AFP (Lucman 2000). Nurullaji Misuari, instructor at the 
state university, took part in the training in Sabah. Aquino welcomed 
them at Malabang, Lanao del Sur; they were called “Top 90,” the %rst 
60 Social Transformations Vol. 1, No. 2, Aug. 2013
batch that would train their fellow rebels (Abbas 2003). Lucmans and 
Aquinos were old political allies; the former was a founding member 
of the Liberal Party. !e relationship between Lucman and Aquino 
became close after the Corregidor incident (Lucman 2010). Why would 
Aquino, a government o"cial, greet the soon-to-be rebels against the 
government he was sworn to serve, even though he was on the other 
side of the fence? Was he abetting rebellion in Mindanao? Aquino 
was privy to what was happening in Sabah and the secret training 
camp provided by the Malaysians. !rough Malaysia, Lucman was 
able to establish contacts with leaders of the Muslim world. Lucman 
established the Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations, the 
umbrella organizations of all national Muslim associations. Malaysia 
reneged on its promise of arms, which Lucman complained of to the 
Malaysians. !e increased politicization of the Muslims led to the 
organization of the secret Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization 
(BMLO) by Lucman, whose timetable for the uprising was moved to 
1972, when the Indo-Pakistan War in June 1971 diverted the 2,000 
high-powered arms from Libya. !e following year, in July, the arms 
on a plane arrived in Sabah, but the Malaysians had other agenda. 
Apart from interference, Malaysians legally advocated, not only with 
their national security in mind but also the Philippine claim to Sabah, 
the neutralization of Southeast Asia as called for by Tun Abdul Razak, 
the new Malaysian prime minister, as expressed at the end of the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 
1971 (Pathmanathan 1979). !e Philippines raised reservations since 
it would endanger the Sabah claim, because a neutralized state could 
neither cede nor acquire territory.
In Sabah, Lucman as the founding leader and supreme head of the 
movement called the chiefs of military units of the Bangsa Moro Army 
for the distribution of arms. Misuari, Lucman’s assistant on military 
a#airs, did not inform the Lanao military heads. He was alleged to 
have led the killing of Cotabato commanders who were against a 
planned coup d’état sanctioned by the Malaysians (Lucman 2010). 
!e other side, however, claimed that Lucman and other traditional 
Moro leaders were planning to use the arms to build their own private 
armies for their own interests (Santos and Santos 2010). Deceived by 
the Malaysians, Lucman was made to stay in Kuala Lumpur like a 
virtual prisoner in a safehouse from October 1972 to February 1973. 
Marcos had declared Martial Law on 21 September, on the grounds 
that communist and secessionist movements had placed the republic 
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under his command in grave danger. Prior to the declaration, Aquino 
was !irting with members of Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA), providing them with moral, 
logistic, and "nancial support. Less than two weeks before martial law, 
Aquino in conversation with two US o#cials “believes that President 
Marcos intends to stay in power inde"nitely and that his own chances 
of becoming head of the government by legitimate means are slight. 
He thus may be willing at some point in the future to ally himself with 
the communists as the leader of a revolution, if he is convinced that 
this is the best way for him to realize his ultimate political ambition” 
(as quoted in Claudio 2010). What does this revelation make of the 
Moro separatism, which he supported? What does this unravel from 
the alleged Corregidor massacre that the Liberal Party made a big 
scandal of, and from their relationship with the Malaysians? Aquino’s 
ambition would come to a point when he would sacri"ce national 
interest for his own advantage. In October, an uprising occurred in 
Marawi, in which 2,000 Muslims were arrested.
According to Lucman, Misuari sold to the Malaysians the arms 
for the Lanao military unit amounting to P700,000 in 1973 (Lucman 
2010). Libyan and Malaysian sympathizers and Misuari divided 
the proceeds. With Lucman sidelined, Misuari assumed command 
as chairman of the MNLF, the name he proposed in 1970 that was 
rejected. Members of the central committee were Abulkayir Alonto 
as vice-chairman, Jamil Lucman, nephew of Rashid, as chief-of-sta$, 
Hashim Salamat, and others. Misuari was groomed as the leader of the 
rebellion by the Malaysian press. Why did the Malaysians marginalize 
Lucman? Were the Malaysians trying to erase from the public mind 
their participation and Lucman’s in the creation of a Moro rebellion by 
supporting Misuari as the head of MNLF? Were they revising history 
so as to hide their complicity in the rebellion? Marcos had to engage 
with Misuari, not Lucman.
GIVING UP THE CLAIM FOR PEACE: 
MARCOS CONFRONTS THE MNLF UNDER 
THE PROTECTION OF MALAYSIA
Aquino before Martial Law was rocking the boat of the détente between 
Malaysia and the Philippines, when he accused the administration of 
sending a Filipino secret agent to be arrested and imprisoned in Sabah 
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(Noble 1977). Marcos denied the allegation; Malaysia said that no 
such person was detained in their country, commenting that Aquino’s 
tirade was in bad taste. !e government was said to be conducting 
hushed discussions. From 1973 to 1976, Malaysia continued to provide 
support to the MNLF through Mustapha, who was a Tausug. Sabah 
remained to be the training camp, supply and communication depot, 
and sanctuary for the rebels, and displaced people in Mindanao and 
Sulu. All these were sanctioned by Kuala Lumpur. On the international 
level, Rahman was responsible for internationalizing the Moro 
problem in Mindanao as the secretary-general of the Organization 
of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1972 (Che Man 1990). !rough 
Rahman’s mediation, the Filipino Muslim rebels gained access to the 
OIC and the Muslim community.
Several representatives of Muslim countries visited the country 
in 1973 to meet with Marcos and agree to possible solutions. In a 
letter by AFP Chief of Sta" Romeo Espino to Marcos, and one of the 
enclosures in the letter to the US embassy by Romulo, the strength 
of the so-called Muslim Revolutionary Forces was assessed at 16,900 
armed with high powered guns and mortars and supported by Malaysia, 
Libya, and Pakistan (US Department of State 1973a). Malaysia was 
now pressuring Marcos to excise from the constitution the article 
referring to Sabah, but the view of Marcos at this time was it should be 
Malaysia which should #rst restore the status quo ante (US Department 
of State 1973b, 1974c). !e following year, in 1974, the MNLF 
engaged in #erce #ght with government troops in Jolo, requiring naval 
bombardment. !e Malaysians succeeded in fomenting a rebellion 
to take away Sabah from the attention of Marcos administration. 
!e Malaysian government was careful in issuing statements against 
the claim and dismissed rumors, not because it was convinced of 
Philippine good intentions, as alleged, but because underneath the 
pronouncements was the continued interference in Philippine a"airs 
through its support to the rebels. Why did Marcos not press charges 
against Malaysia before the proclamation of Martial Law? Was 
he thinking that, in the long run, it would bene#t him through the 
creation of a situation that would force him to declare Martial Law 
and stay longer in power? Marcos was said to be willing to “forget 
everything,” provided that solutions to the problems related to Sabah 
could be worked out with Malaysia (US Department of State 1973e, 
3). Later the Philippines raised this issue of Malaysian complicity in 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and ASEAN, accusing 
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Malaysia of using the Muslim dissidence to blackmail the Philippines 
in abandoning the Sabah claim (US Department of State 1973f ). 
Romulo, when he went to Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN foreign 
ministers meeting, had a talk with Razak in which he pointed out 
Mustapha’s deeper involvement, and that the Sabah ruler, in a meeting 
in Hong Kong with Osmeña, contributed money to the campaign of 
the latter in the 1969 elections in return for dropping the claim if 
Osmeña got elected. Razak lied through his teeth that Malaysia was 
not involved, but admitted that Mustapha and other Sabahans were. 
!ere were rumors that the Philippine government would give 
up the claim, provided that Malaysia would stop helping the rebels. 
When asked about it, Razak denied that Manila made any o"er of that 
kind or that Malaysia had any connection with the Moro insurgency 
(Noble 1977). !ere was a planned meeting between Malaysia and 
the Philippines brokered by Indonesia, but was aborted due to some 
diplomatic faux pas. !e tripartite meeting was moved to 1 June 1973 
in Hong Kong, but it failed (US Department of State 1973g, 1973h). 
!e Philippines insisted on getting compensation #rst for the heirs 
of the sultan before dropping the claim (US Department of State 
1974d). Distrustful of Marcos because they seemed to not get what 
they wanted, Malaysians wanted a unilateral change in policy on the 
Philippine side but they never wanted to help defuse the Muslim 
rebellion in Mindanao and Sulu (US Department of State 1973i). 
!ey viewed it as two separate issues when they were not. Indonesia 
expressed disappointment over Malaysia. Marcos took the perspective 
that the problem in Sulu was tied to Sabah. For that, he was adopting 
a two-pronged approach, one that would make a deal with Mustapha, 
promising him to drop the claim and support for Sabah independence 
movement, in exchange of non-interference in Sulu and another on 
the Mindanao problem, which to him was an internal matter (US 
Department of State 1973j, 1973k). 
Razak, in fact, engaged in double talk, for he was said to have told 
in Islamic meetings that the Moro problem was an internal a"air. At 
the 1974 Islamic Summit in Islamabad, it was him who was said to 
have demanded that the Moro plight was not an internal a"air but 
a concern for the whole Muslim community (Abbas 2003). Marcos 
received as early as March 1974 reports con#rming that Razak was 
personally involved in anti-Philippine government activities in Sabah 
(US Department of State 1974a). He feared that OIC meetings would 
become a platform in which Razak would in$uence Arab oil producers 
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against the Philippines. If Malaysia desired to dismember Sulu from 
the Philippines or “some larger scheme” of destabilization, that could 
be “explosive.” He was grateful to Indonesia, but he felt Malaysia 
frustrated all the e!orts and was playing a bigger game with Libya 
and the Arab states. Mustapha was toying with a Sulu-Sabah state, an 
independent Sabah or a Sabah joining Indonesia (US Department of 
State 1974d; Tilman 1976). In early 1974, he sent a personal emissary 
to Manila for a peace overture, but later repudiated it (US Department 
of State 1975a). On a visit by a Saudi Arabian minister of state, Marcos 
succeeded in presenting the Philippine case, carefully documenting 
Malaysian intervention (US Department of State 1974b). Lahad 
Datu was identi"ed as one of the training sites, along with Banguey 
in Sabah. Malaysia denied its involvement and maintained that the 
Mindanao problem was an internal a!air (US Department of State 
1974c). Razak was fearful that the Philippines might raise the specter 
Malaysia created in Mindanao in ASEAN summits (Noble 1977; 
Quisumbing 1982). 
#e Penang meeting on 6 May 1974 between Razak and Suharto 
yielded no optimism, as Malaysia insisted that the Sabah and Muslim 
con$ict were internal to the Philippines, which was pure untruth. 
Indonesian intelligence had reported of three Malaysian ships trying 
to ferry arms to Sulu. Marcos and Suharto met at Menado on 29 May 
on regional issues as well as on Sabah. Prior to this meeting, Marcos 
was able to set the crowning of a new Sulu sultan, Datu Mohamad 
Mahakuttah Kiram (US Department of State 1974e). It was in Kuala 
Lumpur that the June 1974 OIC meeting of the Islamic Conference 
of Foreign Minister (ICFM) was held, where OIC demanded regional 
autonomy for the Muslims and negotiations with Bangsa Moro 
leaders led by Misuari (Che Man 1990; Abbas 2003). #e visit of OIC 
secretary-general in Manila in the same year diminished whatever 
prospects for negotiation, as it became known to Marcos and his 
cabinet o%cials that Misuari allegedly took orders from Libya under 
the in$uence of radical Arab Pan-Islamists (US Department of State 
1974f ).
Marcos sent Alejandro Melchor to head the government panel 
at the talks held at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia in 1975. He maintained 
that dropping the claim should "rst be preceded by willingness of the 
Malaysian side to cut its involvement with MNLF (US Department 
of State 1975b). #e Middle East talks failed, as the government was 
not ready to accept autonomy as an option. Since Mustapha did not 
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accept the defense portfolio, he had strained relations with Razak, who 
was moving to isolate him. Mustapha pre-empted Razak from dealing 
with Marcos by sending his Sabah defense adviser to Manila (US 
Department of State 1975c). In a reinvestigation of Osmeña/Lopez 
assassination plot against Marcos, Mustapha was linked to a planned 
overthrow of Marcos by Osmeña, who was instigating a revolution with 
Sabah as the base and in connivance with so-called “Sultan” Lucman 
(US Department of State 1975d). In a visit to Singapore in early 1976, 
Marcos announced that he will not push for the claim, likening it to a 
border dispute, which he hoped ASEAN could provide a mechanism 
for settlement (US Department of State 1976a, 1976b). In the same 
year, another government panel, headed by Congressman Carmelo Z. 
Barbero, went to Tripoli to negotiate with the MNLF, resulting in the 
creation of the Tripoli Agreement. Mustapha was replaced by Donald 
Stephens in the elections of April, while Hussein Onn took over Razak. 
Stephens indicated that he would not allow Sabah to be used by the 
Muslim rebels as base. But the MNLF remained active in Sabah up 
to the time of Chief Minister Harris Salleh, who replaced Stephens. 
!e Tripoli agreement failed as Marcos scuttled the provisions. !e 
MNLF su"ered setbacks when Salamat formed a faction, which was 
later to become the nucleus of the MILF. If Misuari is to be believed, 
Malaysia allegedly supported this faction (Pedrosa 2013). 
!e Moro dissidence continued until the remaining days of the 
Marcos regime. Marcos, after attending the funeral of Razak in January 
1976, went back to Kuala Lumpur in August 1977 for an o#cial visit 
to attend the Second ASEAN Summit. It was here that Marcos 
announced that his government would take steps in eliminating one of 
the burdens of ASEAN: the claim (Republic of the Philippines 1977; 
Marcos 1977). To Malaysia a draft of agreement on border crossing 
and joint patrol was handed, which was never signed (Tatad 2000). 
He told newsmen that dropping the claim would be the key to peace 
in Mindanao, and realized that if the Philippines had not pursued 
the claim, there would have been no $ghting in the island. Since we 
have the bene$t of hindsight, he was partially correct with respect to 
Misuari’s MNLF on Sabah, but Salamat’s faction, as events would later 
show, was a di"erent matter all together. !e Malaysian government 
had the boldness to ask, if not dictate, that the 1973 constitution be 
amended and Republic Act 5446 be repealed (Tolentino 1990). !e 
announcement was in keeping with his promise to Onn and Suharto, 
that he would publicly give up claim after Mustapha is defeated (US 
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Department of State 1976d). Onn advised the heirs to take their case 
in Malaysia for the settlement of their proprietary claims (Quisumbing 
1982). It would take another Malaysian prime minister before the 
heirs would act, when they asked Marcos for direct negotiations 
with Malaysia (Sindayen 1981). In December 1979, the Philippine 
government decried the report that Sabah allowed Misuari and his 
men to have 100 motorboats to smuggle arms and ammunition to 
Mindanao, and to transport back casualties to Sabah for treatment 
(Che Man 1990). It was two years previous that Salleh reassured 
Marcos that Sabah would not o!er assistance to MNLF (Republic of 
the Philippines 1977). Was Mustapha, although ousted from power 
but still active in politics, the point of contact by the MNLF? MNLF 
continued to hold conferences there, and the Bangsa Moro News was 
published in Sandakan until 1981 (Noble 1983). More splits occurred 
inside the MNLF in 1982. 
In 1978, Marcos sent some spies to Sabah, not to regain Sabah 
as insinuated (Azurin 1996), but to possibly document by photo the 
activities by MNLF rebels on the island. One of them was caught 
by a Malaysian agent. Was the plan of getting details of speci"c 
sites intended to sow terror in Sabah by agent-provocateurs to 
get even with the Malaysians? Or would they be used as counter-
measure to any plan by the MNLF in collusion with Malaysians? 
Or was it born out of frustration with Malaysia, which after the 
signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
on 24 February 1976 at Bali, kept on violating the principle of 
non-interference? During this year, the Malaysian King, Yang di 
Pertuan Agong, visited Marcos at Malacañang; Onn and Suharto 
o!ered to mediate in the Mindanao con#ict, but Marcos said that, 
although help was welcomed, talks with the MNLF would prove 
di$cult, given the factionalism in the group (Foreign Service 
Institute 1985). In June 1980, Minister of Parliament Arturo 
Tolentino told the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala 
Lumpur that the claim was closed (Quezon 2013). Series of talks 
broke down, when Malaysia disagreed with the Philippine panel. 
Several diplomatic engagements were made on the issue in Manila 
and Kuala Lumpur. Romulo Espaldon, admiral of the Philippine 
navy, however, claimed in October that Malaysia was cuddling 
the Muslim rebels by providing training and base camps in Sabah 
(Samad and Abu Bakar 1992). It was also reported that Malaysian 
ships and aircraft intruded into Philippine territory. 
67The Malaysian Plot
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, in November 1981, alluded 
to anti-government activities on the same island by members of the 
Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (Bulletin Today 1981b). Did 
Sabah become another venue for subversion against the Philippine 
government? As soon as the news was leaked, the Batasan or 
the Philippine national legislature reacted by attempting to !le a 
resolution requesting the president to review the position he took 
in Kuala Lumpur regarding the claim (Dacanay 1982). Marcos was 
quick to call for silence on the issue, because he said it would a"ect the 
ongoing negotiations, although some assemblymen were uneasy over 
the presidential intervention on Batasan a"airs (Valmoria 1981). An 
assemblyman asserted that since Sabah was Philippine territory, it was 
outrageous to allow it to become training grounds for rebels. Malaysia 
had just appointed Mahathir Mohamad as its new prime minister in 
July 1981. Did he know and sanction the use of Jampiras Island as 
base for subversive organizations? In December 1981, a speedboat 
used to ferry arms to the rebels was seized in Mindanao, from which 
Malaysia denied involvement (Bulletin Today 1981a). A diplomatic 
faux pas occurred in early 1982, when the Indonesia ambassador, Leo 
Lopulisa, urged the Philippine government to drop the claim; the 
latter was “extremely displeased” over the remark and summoned the 
presumptuous envoy (Bulletin Today 1982; Puyat 1982).
#e scene turned complicated when, in April 1982, a documentary 
aired in Australia, showing that British and Australian mercenaries 
were involved in the training of Muslim rebels !nanced by Gadda! 
(Samad and Abu Bakar 1992). Were the Malaysian agents named “Mr. 
George” actually British or Australians? #e Malaysians seemed to 
have the full support of Commonwealth nations, as they were willing 
to support destabilization. It was through Malaysia that OIC gave its 
US$1 million contribution to the Moro cause until 1996 (Santos and 
Santos 2010). Despite its open support for the rebels, in November 
1982, the Malaysian foreign ministry has the temerity to ask again 
for the deletion of a clause in the constitution (Quezon 2013). 
Mahathir pressed for the dropping of the claim, and denied receiving 
any communication from Marcos regarding the claim (Foz 1982). 
On the other hand, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza said that the 
government was prepared to establish a consulate in Kota Kinabalu, 
to agree on an international air agreement, and to enter into a border 
crossing agreement (Sindayen 1982). Minister Roberto V. Ongpin 
commenced his secret talks with Mahathir, purportedly on Sabah, that 
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would continue for the next three years. As revealed recently, Aquino, 
before his arrival in Manila to be shot in 1983, passed by Kuala Lumpur 
and talked to Mahathir; he was said to have negotiated that he would 
drop Sabah in exchange for Malaysia’s support for Marcos (Mateo 
2013). Having exposed this revelation, could this be part of the motive 
why he was shot?
!e refugee problem in Sabah was, in fact, a creation of Malaysia, 
contrary to the assertions by Malaysian ambassador that it was a “spill-
over e"ect” imposed on his country (Hani" 1989, 177). !e economic 
dislocation in Sulu and Mindanao was felt acutely by Filipino Muslims 
caught in the middle of the war between the Muslim rebels and the 
Philippine government. Sabah under Salleh allowed the Filipino 
immigrants who arrived before 1976 legal status, while those who 
came after 1976 were considered illegal aliens. During Mustapha’s 
time, Sabah su"ered from lack of manpower, and the #eeing Filipinos 
helped its economy. As early as 1979, however, there were complaints 
by locals that Filipino refugees were robbing them of jobs and 
imputing on them the increase in petty thefts (Asiaweek 1979). By 
1983, the number of Filipino evacuees in Sabah ranged from 160,000 
and 200,000, as a result of a fresh wave of immigrants since 1980 (Che 
Man 1990). Under Chief Minister Pairin Kitingan, a new policy was 
instituted in April 1985, when Sabah government implemented sti"er 
rules on illegal immigration, with the reason that they compete with 
Sabahans on jobs and threaten national security (Samad and Abu 
Bakar 1992).
Marcos was ready to negotiate on the claim with Malaysia. On 
a visit to Brunei during its independence day, the discussion avoided 
Sabah, but was set after the May elections, which never took place 
(Shinn 1984; Tatad 2000). !e reason might point to the continued 
support given by the Malaysians to the rebels, that in 1984, the MNLF 
in Lanao was able to in#ict severe losses to the AFP to the amount 
of P30 million pesos in just three weeks (Lucman 2000). !e sporadic 
attacks of the MNLF in encounters against the government in the 
last years of Marcos could only mean one thing: that the Malaysians 
remained to be the conduit for the supply of arms and ammunitions 
to the Muslim rebels. !e case on Sabah became complicated with the 
entrance of another actor. Redolent of the later Abu Sayyaf, a group 
of bandits attacked Lahad Datu, robbed a bank and killed eleven 
Malaysians on 23 September 1985 (Arevalo 1985). In retaliation, four 
Malaysian gunboats entered Philippine territory, attacked an island in 
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the Sulu archipelago, and killed !fty-three Filipinos. Malaysia denied 
such attacks, but Enrile con!rmed that “unidenti!ed” foreign naval 
ships were seen in the area with "ying vessels escorting. After the 
overthrow of Marcos, many Filipinos would face deportation in Sabah, 
as a crackdown on “illegal” immigrants would ensue.
CONCLUSION
History is a weapon. Fear history, said Andres Bonifacio, whose 
sesquicentennial birth anniversary, will be celebrated this year. 
Why should we fear history with respect to Sabah? It is because it 
disentangles the knots behind so many unexplained actions. It provides 
the weapon to anyone willing to shape correct policies in pursuit of 
national interests. History can be viewed in multifarious angles and 
perspectives. In my point of view, Sabah could be seen as one of the 
many invisible cogs in Philippine postwar history, one that has had 
more in"uence than any other issues in foreign and national a#airs 
of the country. It led to the clamor for independence of Mindanao 
by Filipino Muslims due to the Jabidah “massacre.” It was used as a 
major campaign issue by the Liberal Party against Marcos. $e claim 
encouraged Malaysia to intervene in the south. $e Moro rebellion 
and the communist threat were two factors, along with greed for power, 
that forced Marcos to declare Martial Law. Malaysian interference 
since 1968 fueled the escalation of Moro rebellion through Lucman 
and, later, MNLF. $e peace negotiations continued long after the 
MNLF su#ered from factionalism, !rst in MILF, a Maguindanao 
splinter group that is now negotiating with the government, and the 
old guard and new ones. Failure to resolve the Muslim armed struggle 
deepened the class and ethnic divisions in the south. While Mindanao’s 
economy deteriorated, Sabah’s, although least developed among the 
states of Malaysia, fared better. 
Sabah and its rami!cations may surprise or even shock some, for 
it became the bombshell that pitted Marcos and the Liberal Party. It 
was also a fodder for the insatiable ambition of Ninoy Aquino in his 
quest for the presidency. His exposé nearly imperiled Marcos and his 
chances of winning a second-term. $e supposed massacre was turned 
into a propaganda material for the Muslim separatism. It invited the 
intervention of Malaysia in Philippine a#airs. Aquino supported the 
rebellion in Mindanao against the government, a patent treason he also 
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did when he made contact and even encouraged the CPP-NPA. He 
was willing to surrender Sabah to court Malaysia on his !ght against 
Marcos. Marcos and Aquino were made for each other; the former, 
in his lust for power, wanted to protect the status quo from the latter, 
who wanted it wrested through violent means because of his ambition 
to lead the country. Can we say Marcos is more patriotic than Aquino, 
or was Ninoy more heroic than Macoy? In light of these, is Ninoy 
really a hero? "e excesses of martial law could have been forgiven, 
when economic development trickled down to the poor and spelled 
genuine economic prosperity. All these were happening in the midst of 
Moro secessionism and communist insurgency, two movements that 
Ninoy has dipped his hands into. On the other hand, Malaysia after 
the 1969 ethnic riot and communist movement in North Kalimantan, 
did not face serious insurgency, except that it supported one to serve as 
diversion from Sabah. We are still paying the high price of Malaysian 
intervention that made Sulu one of the poorest provinces in the 
country. 
It is time to end the Malaysian plot to keep Sabah away from 
its real owners. Playing with great powers, the Sulu Sultanate was 
itself caught in a great power rivalry among Spain, Germany, and 
Britain, and between Britain and the United States. Sulu surrendered 
its sovereignty over its territory, including Sabah, on 22 July 1878 to 
Spain. When a royal charter was granted to the British North Borneo 
Company in 1881, Spain protested but later relented. In the Protocol 
of 1885, Spain renounced its claims over North Borneo, while in the 
boundary convention of 1930, Sabah was seemingly not included as 
part of Philippine territory, so that the 1935 Philippine Constitution 
would de!ne the national territory on this and the other earlier 
treaties. "e boundary convention, however, did not consider that the 
sultanate had come under US sovereignty, so that by 1935, upon the 
establishment of the Commonwealth, Sabah was implicitly placed 
within Philippine territory. Article III of the protocol was ambiguous, 
one with an intention to deceive, that Spain renounced all her claims 
“over the territories of the continent of Borneo, which belong, or which 
have belonged in the past to the Sultan of Sulu [my italics].” Political 
realities may have forced the sultanate to waive its sovereign authority 
to Spain and the US, hoping perhaps either of the two could bring it 
back as the patrimony of its people. "e US was not able to do so, and 
Filipino nationalists like Quezon seemed to have ignored the claim. 
Heir to the British imperialists, the Malaysians kept on ignoring 
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that what they claimed as theirs is only a property leased, or if they 
want ceded, in perpetuity from the Sulu Sultanate administered by 
the British, whose sovereignty remained in the sultan before it was 
annexed illegally in 1946. !e Atlantic Charter of which Britain was 
signatory in 1941 stated that they “seek no aggrandisement, territorial 
or other.” But "ve years later, the North Borneo cession order was 
promulgated. !e principle of self-determination cannot be invoked 
without "rst settling the proprietary claims of the sultanate and the 
sovereign rights of the Philippines. Neither the reason of e#ective 
sovereignty as the basis of Malaysian possession (Othman 1970) could 
take precedence over the titular rights of the Sulu Sultanate and, later, 
Philippine government as the bestower of that sovereignty.
!e dissolution of the Sulu sultanate by virtue of acts and 
treaties, as well as the enactment of the basic law of the land, made 
the Philippine government the successor-in-sovereignty to Sabah, 
while its proprietary rights are reserved for the heirs of the sultan. 
Instruments revoking the lease in 1957 and stipulating cession in 
1962 signed by Sultan Muhammad Ismail Kiram are redundant. !e 
revocation of the cession to the Philippine government in 1989 by 
the present sultan was not only unwarranted but devoid of any legal 
basis. He has no sovereign power to do that. If “lease in perpetuity” in 
international law means ninety-nine years, then Sabah had reverted 
back to the Philippines in 1977 (Ramos 1968, 15). Hong Kong was 
ceded, not leased, in perpetuity; Britain returned it to Beijing in 
1997 after ninety-nine years. When Marcos decided to withdraw 
the claim on that year, he did not know that the lease had expired. 
From 1977 up to present, technically, the Philippines owned Sabah as 
part of its territory, because it did not renew the lease. Deportations 
made by Malaysia since 1977 were and are therefore illegal and 
acts of aggression against Philippine sovereignty. Malaysia, without 
surrendering Sabah or negotiating another contract in 1977 with the 
Philippine government, is illegally occupying Sabah, deserving their 
expulsion from the land by any means. Seen in this light, the Lahad 
Datu incident is an unjust provocation on the side of Malaysia that 
should have been met with strongest military action by the Philippine 
government. In theory, the Philippines and Malaysia are in state of war 
due to the illegal occupation of Sabah since 1977.
!us, it is farcical why Malaysia is kept in the peace process 
with the MILF as the “impartial” and “disinterested” third party. !e 
continuation of armed struggle in Mindanao, which it supported, is in 
72 Social Transformations Vol. 1, No. 2, Aug. 2013
keeping with its national interest to sidestep the resolution of the claim. 
!e MILF has no interest in Sabah, while Misuari has realized lately 
that Sabah should be included as part of the resolution of the con"ict. 
He was formerly part of the conspiracy, as he himself acknowledged 
in an interview with Al Jazeera, to derail the settlement of the claim 
(Pedrosa 2013). !e Malaysian devious tactic was consistent. Lucman 
was deposed. Misuari was groomed to be known as the founder of the 
separatist movement, the MNLF. When negotiation with Philippine 
government was reached, a faction developed within the MNLF 
through MILF. If Misuari is to be believed, his MNLF faction fell 
out of the good graces of Malaysia, for suspicion that MNLF would 
turn against them. Misuari belongs to the Sama Cabingaan ethnic 
group but is usually known as Tausug. He grew up knowing the Sulu 
Sultanate and its claim on Sabah, as his great ancestor was allegedly 
one of the many warriors who joined the campaign to suppress the 
rebellion in Brunei. Salamat, founder of MILF, was a Maguindanaoan; 
he has no stake on the claim. MILF has issued a press statement that 
it would not meddle into Sabah (Free Malaysia Today 2013). Al-Haj 
Murad Ibrahim said in an interview with a Malaysian daily that with 
the coming of peace in Mindanao, he expects that Filipino immigrants 
in Sabah would return to their homeland, when Sabah was part of 
their homeland, most especially to the Tausugs, Bajaus, and Samas 
(New Straits Times 2013). Dealing with the MILF rather than MNLF 
tilts the balance in favor of the Malaysians, who wanted at all costs to 
deny the claim from the Tausugs and the Philippine government.
What is to be done? Peace process should not be rushed. Malaysia 
must get out of the negotiating panel. !e Philippine government 
must censure, in strongest terms, the role of Malaysia in fomenting 
rebellion in Mindanao, and that it must stop supporting rebels in the 
region. Other countries (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia) must also be warned. Britain deserves to be reproached for 
failing to honor the contract and for reneging its obligations by passing 
it to Malaysia. Like a conceited imperialist, it ignored the earlier 
moves of the Philippine government. What Sukarno and Macapagal 
feared as a British neocolonial design in Malaysia, happened in the 
long run with the phantom of Sabah hovering over the land. In a latest 
unveri#ed report, the US seems to have a hand in the Lahad Datu 
episode in connivance with the Malaysian opposition, which is willing 
to support an autonomous Sabah to make way for an American base in 
that area in return for US support in the upcoming elections (!e Mole 
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2013). It might be a part of US geopolitical strategy of containing 
China, and this might provide the reason why the American modern 
naval ship got stuck in Tubbataha reef. !e Philippine government 
must be very cautious for any sly move by the US and the Malaysian 
politicians that may compromise the claim to Sabah. It was the height 
of folly when Cory Aquino government became hostage to Malaysia’s 
national interest, since the Constitutional Commission agreed to take 
out certain phrases in the provision on national territory. Where in the 
world can you "nd a foreign entity dictating to a sovereign country 
what is to be done with its basic law? Looking back, the recognition 
of Malaysia was the biggest diplomatic blunder that the Philippine 
government did. In retrospect, the plan to invade or in"ltrate Sabah 
is justi"ed in the name of Philippine national interests. If it took its 
course, it may have drastically changed Philippine history. If Malaysia 
keeps on pursuing its present policy of denying our claim, it is only by 
force of arms that we can get back Sabah.
Abubakar (2000), to whose memory this article is dedicated, 
singled out the exclusion of Sabah in peace negotiations, cited the 
continuing identi"cation of Sulus with Sabah, that during the prime 
of the sultanate was a lucrative trading area, and called for its inclusion 
in any peace deal. Sabah is left out of the recently signed framework. 
Manangkayan, the local name of the Spratly Islands, was within the 
territory of the Sulu Sultanate. Should it not be included in any "nal 
peace agreement to bolster our claim against China’s? It is also out of 
tune with the constitution. !e charter did not stipulate the creation 
of a substate or state. !e complete revision of the constitution, 
providing for an improvised political system, not necessarily federal 
but indigenous, not only for the Muslims and the Igorots but for all 
other ethnic groups and their underdeveloped regions, could solve 
the problem. I suggest the revival of the Sulu Sultanate with limited 
ceremonial powers. Its restoration would put an end to the numerous 
claimants to the throne that is becoming pathetic. !e present 
predicament favors Malaysia, because it can use the issue to downplay 
the claim or to further divide the Tausugs by bringing one to its side. 
A permanent and long-lasting resolution is needed, not in a piecemeal 
fashion as the framework is, not only toward the Muslims but to all 
marginalized Filipinos, victims of Manila imperialism. Any peace deal 
with the Moros must be preceded by the consolidation of all Muslim 
militant and rebel groups into one cohesive organization to once and 
for all end the endless splits that happened and will happen in the 
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future. !e future of all Muslims hangs on their ability to unite in spite 
of ideological, class, and ethnic di"erences. First, we must recognize the 
true colors of Malaysia as the one that caused the subordination of the 
claim and the disunity among Muslims, and its dishonest pretensions 
to peace, to begin the next paces toward the self-determination and 
development of the peoples of Mindanao, Sulu, and Sabah. 
As a footnote to why Marcos did not comply with his 1977 
pronouncement of dropping the Sabah claim, Minister of Foreign 
A"airs Arturo M. Tolentino (1990) related the following that happened 
in 1984: “Before I made that statement at the ASEAN summit, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister and I had a private talk. We agreed that 
as a quid pro quo for the announcement I was going to make, that 
he would see to it that Sabah would cease to be a training ground for 
rebels in Mindanao as a departure point for arms smuggling into the 
Philippines. !ese promises have not yet complied with, and so we 
cannot as yet comply with our commitment.” Marcos was steadfast in 
his approach to Sabah since 1973: that Malaysia must #rst disengage 
from supporting the Moro rebels before giving in to their demands. 
Although he was an astute, even wily, foreign a"airs tactician, he erred 
in the selection of men who could have successfully executed his plan 
to invade Sabah, and was unable to anticipate and prevent Malaysian 
intervention. What he wanted to happen in Sabah, occurred in 
Mindanao and Sulu, thus becoming his headache in the years to 
arrive. !e question remains, however: was there really an intention to 
subvert Sabah and provoke war, or was this part of a psy-war strategy 
by Marcos to pressure Malaysia to the negotiating table? If there was 
no Arula, could there have been a successful resolution of the Sabah 
claim? I doubt it.
NOTES
1 I wish to express my gratitude to Amy Reytar and Rebecca L. Collier of the US 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for their assistance in 
accessing this particular reference.
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